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The historical and actual marginalizations of African thought systems and knowledge
constructions have been expansively responsible for the effectiveness of the dominant
educational and governance systems imposed on Africa. The idea as well as the practice of
these realities would conform to what Said (1993), Fanon (1967, 1968), and Memmi
(1991) have called the cultural and psychosocial colonizations of both the physical and
mental spaces of the conquered. The reality also speaks about the role of Europe’s most
important thinkers such as Kant, Hobbes, and Voltaire, who all directly or indirectly paved
the way for the projects of “de-philosophization” and “de-epistemologization” that still
affect people’s lives. With the emergence of new cosmopolitanisms now creating highly
multicultured societies in especially the so-called liberal democracies of the West, new
contexts have also emerged of what one might counterintuitively call the
“multiculturalization of knowledge marginalizations.” Thus there is an urgent need to aim
for knowledge and learning multicentricities that both theoretically and pragmatically
rewrite the learning trajectories of both the old colonized space and the new, still alienating
multicultural classrooms. This article engages the historical and actual problematizations
of the case and suggests some ideas for better possibilities that could enhance the schooling
lives of current globally located learners.
La marginalisation historique et actuelle des systèmes de pensée et des constructions des
connaissances africaines a été largement responsable de l’efficacité des systèmes d’éducation
et de gouvernance dominants imposés à l’Afrique. En théorie et en pratique, ces réalités se
conformeraient à ce que Saïd (1993), Fanon (1967, 1968) et Memmi (1991) ont nommé les
colonisations culturelles et psychosociales des espaces physiques et mentaux des conquis.
La réalité évoque également le rôle des plus grands penseurs européens comme Kant,
Hobbes et Voltaire qui, tous, ont préparé le terrain, directement ou indirectement, aux
projets de «déphilosophisation» et «déépistémologisation» dont l’influence sur la vie des
gens se fait encore sentir. L’émergence de nouveaux cosmopolitismes créant des sociétés
hautement multiculturelles, surtout dans les prétendues démocraties libérales de
l’Occident, de nouveaux contextes de ce qu’on pourrait appeler, de façon contre-intuitive,
la «multiculturalisation des marginalisations des connaissances» ont également vu le jour.
Un besoin urgent existe donc pour la multicentricité des connaissances et de
l’apprentissage pour réécrire, théoriquement et pragmatiquement, les trajectoires
d’apprentissage tant de l’ancien espace colonisé que des nouvelles salles de classe
multiculturelles toujours aliénantes. Cet article discute de la problématique historique et
actuelle du cas, et propose quelques possibilités pour rehausser la vie scolaire des
apprenants actuels partout sur la planète.
Introduction
The role of education in the development of societies is by and large an
agreed-on perspective that might be universally claimed (Abdi & Guo, 2008).
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In current configurations of life, the systems of education we have are mainly
the result of global interactions that were instigated by European colonialism
that started in the Americas with the fateful voyages of Christopher Columbus
and his hordes of Spanish conquistadores, later followed by the full expansion
of the project into Africa, Asia, Oceania, and other parts of the world. Clearly
before this story started, there were Indigenous knowledge systems that char-
acterized the educational realities of these societies. In the African case, as
Nyerere (1968, 1974), Rodney (1982), and Semali (1999) have pointed out, these
Indigenous systems were important for the development of the communities
that designed them and used them for the sustainable improvement of the
people concerned. The main factor in these comments is that the cultural and
linguistic categories of traditional education were the construction blocks that
created and sustained these types of learning, and these were based on a reality
that was capable of achieving practical schemes of well-being that would
benefit the needs and expectations of the people.
In terms of the measurable effectiveness of these traditional education sys-
tems, they were contextually as effective as anything that was invented after
them. Interestingly, this is not the current dominant story when we talk about
traditional educational and knowledge systems in the context of today’s learn-
ing arrangements. And what we know about the case is not an accidental
happenstance; we did not all somehow become enamored of current European
systems of learning and assume that everything before this was ineffective,
unorganized, and unfit for the social development objectives of people. In fact
from the European perspective, globally impactful events such as these are
hardly accidental. They are planned and implemented with rigorous pro-
gramming and long-term intentions and are more often than otherwise imple-
mented for clear cost-benefit platforms that advance the projects of the
encounter between contexts, cultures, and life systems. Again, as Nyerere
(1968), Rodney (1982), and Abdi (2006) noted, the colonial project was deter-
mined to achieve the two important and parallel schemes of first demeaning
and decommissioning the instructional and learning values of traditional
African education, and then destroying the platforms of development that it
was achieving for the people. This is related to the heavily underresearched
tempo-cultural trajectories of colonialism.
The Colonial Project and its Multilocational Effect
As I have informally discussed in various forums, the colonial project is first
and foremost psychological. In initial contacts with the African people, a sense
of European superiority, sometimes through gifts and related novelties and
later complemented by the impressive display of technological mechanisms,
was established. Here an intervening question could be, Why did Africans buy
into the falsehood of this racist superiority? There should be, of course, a few
possible responses to this important and historically inclusive question. But a
central response could be the fundamental difference in the general onto-exis-
tentialities of Africans and Europeans. Whereas Africans firmly believe in and
adhere to the unqualified humanization of all peoples regardless of their back-
ground, cultural attachments, linguistic intersections, and observable physical
characteristics, Europeans during the spread of colonialism came from a con-
tinent where economic exigencies were to supersede everything else. As
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Césaire (1972) so cogently noted, the expansive fateful contact between the two
peoples took place when the captains of emerging industrial conglomerates in
Europe were heavily influencing public policy and national programs, with the
profit principle greatly influencing European life. This was complemented by
the fact that colonialism was driven by economic crisis in Europe, which as one
of the greatest colonialists, the Englishman Cecil Rhodes, said was to be inven-
tive by finding new lands to exploit. So succinctly, these diametrically opposed
world views established new relations where one group expected the best of
human qualities from the other, and the other was bent on relegating the
former to an economically viable commodity to be used as occasioned by
international market forces.
Beyond the psychological, colonialism was also cultural. With the prelimi-
nary psychological effects already achieved, Europeans emphasized how their
cultural traits were advanced, more coherent, and more effective in achieving
life possibilities that were not only better than the lowly Africa ways of exist-
ing, but actually necessitated the Other’s need to adopt them for human advan-
cement (Said, 1993, 2002). Hence the highly announced so-called European
high culture that was supposed to achieve la mission civilisatrice for the civiliza-
tionally benighted of the earth. Interestingly, the outcome of the civilizing
mission was for all harnessable undertakings anything but civilizing. The
expansiveness of the physical and mental destruction wrought on the lives of
the colonized by colonialism—what Hall (2006) might call the problematic
deconstructions of spaces, histories, environments, and identities—has been
abundantly discussed by some of the best historians of the social psychology of
colonialism (Césaire, 1972; Fanon, 1967, 1968; Memmi, 1991; wa Thiongo, 1986),
and we do not need to say much about it. It suffices to mention here that its
effects are still being fully felt and will continue to torment the lives of the
colonized and their offspring for decades if not centuries to come. Indeed,
while many well-intentioned people will advise us to “forget blaming
colonialism” for the woes of the current world system, more sober analysts
should disagree. In doing the right thing, Gilroy (2005) notes how “the count-
less tales of colonial brutality are too important to be lightly or prematurely
disposed of” (p. 48). In the new configurations of the continuing imperial
order, therefore, the continuing humiliation of non-Western peoples through
fabricated wars and the harsh realities of deliberate economic exclusion should
represent what Gilroy calls the still operative project of “colonial alterity.”
From the cultural point of view, the most potent weapon that colonialism
has employed to deconstruct—indeed deform—the lives and futures of people
was colonial education. Apparently this is counter to the first pointers men-
tioned above where education was supposed to lead to the social development
of individuals and societies. This development as we understand it today
would comprise among few other things the socioeconomic, politico-cultural,
and psychoemotional well-being of people. However, colonial education con-
stituted so-called systems of learning that were against the historical, linguistic,
and cultural attachments of African life (Achebe, 2000; Shizha, 2008; wa Thion-
go, 1986). Here one important objective of this type of schooling was to cleanse
the persona Africana of anything that was African. In psychoemotional and
cultural terms, the devastating outcomes of these schemes of miseducation
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may not be difficult to ascertain. As we now know, culture should have been
and has been partly rescued from the early sociological and anthropological
warehouse where it was stored, which especially and in relation to colonized
populations spoke about and depicted them as helpless childlike creatures
whose existentially static lives were to be reformed for their own salvation. The
new analysis of the cultural terrain is now more endowed and should be
understood as culture extensively locating and operationalizing all aspects of
people’s lives. Culture should be dynamic, evolving, and activating or deac-
tivating through temporal and relational changes, the political, economic, edu-
cational, and aspirational contextualizations of societies and the life systems
that define their world.
Colonial Systems of Education and the De-philosophizations of Africa
With colonial education rescinding the cultural platforms of people’s educa-
tion, it was also de-philosophizing the basic raison d’être of the whole learning
project. Undoubtedly all educational programs, whether traditional and
precolonial, colonial or postcolonial, have their own philosophies of teaching.
That is, as Ozmon and Craver (1998) note, a clear way of analyzing and
responding to the universal questions of the main questions of the philosophy
of education: what education we need, why we need it, and how we do it. As
indicated above, for traditional societies the questions were clear and practical
in their lives, hence the assumed validity and relevance of the learning pro-
grams that they put together for both juvenile and adult learners in their
communities. Indeed, this was also the case for colonial education where the
overarching objectives were not to educate the colonized, but to inculcate in
their minds inter alia (a) their natural need for the colonizer, (b) their inter-
nalization of extensive psychocultural regimes that affirmed their inferiority
vis-à-vis the colonizing entity, and (c) their training to support the project of
colonization.
Interestingly, the story of de-philosophization did not end there. With the
historical notations and unidirectional conclusions so important in colonial
relationships, the simple deployment by the European metropolis through
some of the important European thinkers and writers that Africans were
“aphilosophical” was enough to rescind immediately in the simple minds of
the former any possibility that the latter had any capacity to create and sustain
effective platforms of educational philosophies that could justify the viability
of their learning programs. The claim was, of course, breathtakingly false. And
clearly the more inclusive attendances of popular philosophy as the organized,
and at times disorganized, observable or speculative inquiry about our world,
which fully fits with the African preferences in the area, were to be selectively
rescinded.
At the interval of the debates, though, the peculiarly sought scientism of
philosophy might not arrive, and perhaps in more than any other area of the
social sciences and humanities, philosophers should be happy to broaden the
perspectival contours of the tradition. As Osei (1971) noted,
Africans have their own ideas about the nature of the universe, time and space,
about appearance and reality, and about freedom and necessity. The efforts of
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the African to interpret man [and woman] in relation to the universe shows just
as much intelligence as we find in the philosophy of the Greeks. (p. 19)
Analyzing the topic from a descriptively related but with quasi-detached
analytical intentions, Towa (1997) some years later, adds the following:
African philosophy is the exercise by Africans by a specific type of intellectual
activity applied to the African reality. The type of intellectual activity in
question is as such, neither African, nor European, Greek or German; it is
philosophy in general. What is African are the men [and women] of flesh and
bones who are and who evoke the problems of supreme importance and on
whom these problems are applicable immediately. (p. 195)
As expected, the appeal for a multicentric platform of world philosophies
interests those whose exclusionary theorizing favors their constructions and
deconstructions of history and society. Needless to say, the continuities of the
globally dominant unicentricism did not and could not silence the counter-
logocentric realities of people’s actualities. So much so that in Césaire’s terms
(cited in Masolo, 2000), the rationality of European enlightenment could not
disentangle itself from the cruel deeds of the colonial master, and for the
natives the overall fluidity of life, the refusal to follow the parametering order
of reason, and the delight to superlativize the occasionally disorganized noise,
the shouts that define life and the I that mediates all these, are people’s ways of
exercising their existential liberation and livelihood freedoms. So despite all the
problems, the community has survived, and even new formations of the phi-
losophical tradition have been accentuated. Among these is Odera Oruka’s
(1991) work in Sage Philosophy, which showed how the expressed thoughts of
wise men and women in any community could meet the scholarly demands of
any philosophical treatise, especially as analyzed with respect to didactic wis-
dom, expounded wisdom, and rational thought. And although in the colonial
context the clash of cultures and systems of knowing on all things personal and
knowledge-based should have been intense, it eventually favored those whose
superior technologies subjugated those who were more interested in the
humanity of their oppressors.
The Importance of the Epistemological Platforms
In the varied intersections where cultures and philosophies of human develop-
ment meet, the questions of epistemology should also be important. In their
most generalizable terms, epistemological questions usually deal with specific
epistemic clusters and ways of knowing that are embedded in or define them.
As Fumerton (2006) noted, all epistemologies usually involve the conceptual
constructions of knowledge and knowable platforms of learning evidence that
would all be attached to the justification of what is to be understood, probabil-
ities of knowing, and other epistemic processes that justify the acquisition of
the previously unknown. In Africa’s encounter with the colonial project,
African epistemologies went the way of African education and attached philos-
ophies of learning. Here historically entrenched and socially effective oral
epistemologies were rescinded willy-nilly, and the imposition of the text-borne
knowledge created specific impediments that immediately disfavored any ed-
ucational development for the African people. As wa Thiongo (1993) and Allen
(2004) discussed, knowledge and its epistemological characteristics cannot and
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should not be proscribed by whether they can be linguistically articulated, for
we factually learn so much else that is clearly constituted in the language
categories of daily life.
It is through these realities that the issue of contextualization should be
paramount in how we construct or deconstruct the epistemological conjectures
that locate and refine schooling, general learning, and any resulting pos-
sibilities for social development. For me, contextualization represents an im-
portant praxis in the continuum of creating ideas, conceptualizing those ideas,
examining their educational viability in specific temporal and spatial intersec-
tions of schooling, concretizing as much as possible their applicability in select
life systems, and formulating them as applicable to local or even international
programmatic realities that directly and sometimes indirectly affect how
people live. As such, contextualization should induce important epistemologi-
cal possibilities that can affirm the viability of knowledge systems in one
location or another. By ignoring the basic importance of contextualization,
colonialism in Africa and elsewhere took away the relevance of learning pro-
grams and disentangled so much that would have helped the socially and
environmentally responsive intentions and actions of human progress. It is on
the basis of these realities that I am attracted to pragmatic philosophies of
education, which also greatly appealed to three of the most important philoso-
phers of the past century, Dewey (1926, 1963), Nyerere (1968, 1974), and Freire
(2000). In effect, pragmatic philosophies of education focus on the irreducibility
of actual contexts of learning where the ideologies or theories of education
should be subjected to the pragmatics of educational possibilities. Undoubted-
ly, precolonial African philosophies of education were pragmatic in that they
responded to the histories, cultures, and the needs: ’ka’dadka Afrikaanka ah
(African people), and were as such conducive to both the physical and emo-
tional well-being of the community.
Also associated with colonial problems of decontextualization are the inter-
group realities of deconscientization as opposed to transformationally
desirable probabilities of conscientization (Freire, 2000) where people become
convinced that they were created to serve the interests of the colonizer. As
Memmi (1991) so effectively discussed in his classic The Colonizer and the
Colonized, with subaltern populations gradually internalizing heavy doses of
perforce operationalized inferioritizations of their ontologies, philosophies,
and epistemologies, they begin to collaborate with the colonized on the exten-
sive “oppressionalizations” of both their psyche and corpus. Here the multi-
tude of the multidirectionally interwoven cultural and social attachments
should not be underestimated. As Fanon (1967) so effectively analyzed, the loss
of subjective agency assures the objectification of self, which could in turn
effect an explosion of demerit points in people’s capacity to understand and
analyze their environment, critically evaluate their context, and achieve requi-
site alternatives in the course of their lives.
Among the items in the colonial philosophies of education storehouse, for
example, were the number of years most natives needed to service the colonial
economy and the areas of specialization they were allowed to enter. In many
cases, colonized populations were not allowed to go beyond grade 7, with the
general understanding that such limitations were essential for two important
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reasons. The first was that they would give the natives some form of under-
standing in terms of what they could contribute to the effective exploitation of
their physical and human resources by colonialism. The second was to keep
from the natives enough learning capacity that might help them develop into
well-informed and critically aware citizens who could question their rights
vis-à-vis the colonizing entity. As Rodney (1982) noted, this was one of many
ways by which Europe achieved the underdevelopment of Africa. In Rodney’s
intentions here, with which I agree, development should not be measured by
the sophistry of available technologies or per se accumulation of material
resources, but on people’s satisfaction with their overall relationship with
regard to their social and physical environments. Here, instead of using the
enlightenment-driven measurement of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which
as it is intended today attempts to establish tangible correspondence between a
country’s GDP and level of development, one may opt for the model created by
the Himalayan mountain kingdom of Bhutan where Gross Domestic Happi-
ness (GDH) takes precedence. Indeed, this GDH idea is if for no other purposes
interesting in that it speaks about a possible alternative to the perverted,
marked, and mastered survival of the fittest model that has led to the pauperiza-
tion of hundreds of millions in the current so-called and aptly misnamed global
economic downturn. The downturn was actually a quasi-permanent livelihood
perspective for billions of the world’s disenfranchised, but because it has now
touched the lives of the globe’s first-class citizens in North America, Europe,
and few other “developed” areas, it is bad and should be fought against by all
means.
Again, to illustrate the important point on meaning and possible trajectories
of development in ancient Africa and how the European metropolis
reconstructed it more inclusively, an example I use in my teaching is the
possible analysis of defining and operationalizing the phenomenon with
respect to a farmer in Mozambique who has a small plot of land with a small
house in the middle that she cultivates and that yields enough for herself and
her family. This farmer achieves enough contextual happiness in the situation
in which she resides and can do more: probably she would not negatively affect
the environment that sustains her livelihood. The farmer achieves even more:
the combination of the organic food she harvests, which feeds the family; the
clean environment in which she lives; and the assumed happiness she enjoys
all assure her physical health and the health of her family. In the simple
constructions of this simple narrative, contrast this life with that lived by the
developed par excellence. For me this could be someone who writes advanced
computer mathematics in Silicon Valley in north-central California in the
United States, who in one of the most important aspects of his life creates the
advanced number-based formulae for the achievement of exceedingly ad-
vanced technologies that supposedly enhance and simplify our lives. Here the
psychological platforms are important in that the meanings of life enhance-
ment will depend on who is doing the defining. For the purpose of this
argument, though, let us say more about our subject, the explosively developed
computer scientist.
He is tense, perennially short of time, continually in competition with
everyone else; he is also highly irritable with any personal or professional
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distractions and does not comprehend the lowly world of social relations. For
him isolation and the “mathematicizable” rationing of time with especially
trained specialist creatures is sacred. By extension he is continually pressed for
everything, expansively complains about physical and mental fatigue, con-
tinually worries about the scarcity of reformattable domains that could accord
him more interconnected and numerically endowed platforms that could
herald next-generation computing interfaces for the delayed harnessing of
fame and fortune, and overall does not enjoy anything that is elementally or
organically subjective. The de-academicized nature of the story here should not
be an accident. In our discussions of the history and the actualities of Africa,
colonialism, philosophical and epistemological issues, and the role of educa-
tion in human well-being, the essence of the case cannot disengage from social
development, which is either enhanced and/or obstructed in one context or
another. Even in the Bhutan case, the Western media might have reduced it to
an exotic, even Utopianistic peculiarity that should not represent the real needs
of people. And they may have a point there, but only on the basis of the
post-facto world where unattainable and culturally unappreciable develop-
ment needs have been implanted in the minds of people (Rahnema, 1997). The
above story may also be minimized on the rationale of assumed postmodern
relativism, or as some well-intentioned but expansively uninformed people
would say, everything goes theories. Factually, though, there is nothing, despite
the proliferation of the idea that can be called postmodern relativism. As I
understand it, postmodernism and its later theorists such as Jacques Derrida,
Jean Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, Helen Cixous, and selectively Michel
Foucault among others, with the original conceptualizations of the area having
actually come from African and African-Caribbean historians and sociologists
of colonialism including Fanon, Memmi, Césaire, and Achebe (see partly Fis-
cher, 1992) never advocated for any open, trajectory-deprived relativism. Re-
search in this important area of study simply helped usher in new platforms of
appreciating the historical contributions and current validities of extensive
clusters of knowledge that fitted the life development schemes of the contexts
for which they were created.
The point on the contextualization of knowledges is important in creating
and sustaining African philosophies and epistemologies of education. The
issue of contextualization should again highlight the unannounced colonial
agenda that knew how the de-philosophization and the de-epistemologization
of African educational and cultural platforms could facilitate the imposition of
new non-authentic identities on people, where through the attached processes
of misrecognition, loss of self-esteem, and possibly self-efficacy (Taylor, 1995)
could truncate the subjective initiatives and the development potential of
people. Undoubtedly the colonial mission in this domain has been realized,
and as I say above, the reliable regimes of mental colonization that afflicted the
lives of colonized Africans and others in similar historical circumstances are
extensive and of longue durée, especially in how Ferdinand Braudel and not all
his followers have used this historical-materialist point. Clearly Foucault’s
(1980) Pouvoir/Savoir (Power/Knowledge) analysis of the epistemic and power-
mediated livelihood intersections of socioeconomic and political realities was
not lost on his colonizing compatriots a century or so earlier. But even with the
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relevance of the postmodern perspective to analyze and critique select aspects
of the exclusionist theories of modernity where only those who fit the fast
trajectories of the computer mathematician mentioned above are modern and
developed and the rest are primitive, backward, and underdeveloped, there
are still select concerns that we should raise with postmodernist assumptions
One of these, as far as I am concerned, is its avant-garde presumption about
who can speak for whom, and what major theorists know about the
knowledges they might have intended to validate vis-à-vis those who have
created and used these savoirs in the first place. As such, there might be some
analytical vacuity in the historical and cultural platforms that postmodernism
uses to make sense of the myriad issues that constitute its theoretical domains
and attached descriptive and learning outcomes. So although it should tenta-
tively claim the possible noble formations of new voice for the philosophically,
epistemically, and epistemologically silenced, it may accidentally add to the
vocal and pedagogical disempowerment of the already globally dis-
enfranchised. Thus postmodernism, despite its usefulness in select notations of
knowledge and development debates, has a historical disadvantage, and the
way forward for African epistemic and philosophico-cultural enfranchise-
ments, must ipso facto come from Africa proper.
Among the main difficulties faced in achieving this important re-philoso-
phization and re-epistemologization by Africans are (a) the policy and pro-
gram continuities of colonial education, and (b) the homogenizing effects of
globalization where extra-local economic interests and demands limit both
state and institutional capacities to recreate entrenched systems of teaching and
learning. A simple example is how so many resources that are needed to
deconstruct the problematic platforms of education and development and
reconstruct new possibilities are hampered by the weight of the interest pay-
ments (and only interest payments) on the debt African countries owe to
Western countries and their financial institutions, which are paid yearly and
which many times exceed the amount of expenditure available for educational
and other forms of social development. It is these predatory international
financial institutions’ schemes of life that continually limit the constructive
reconstructions of education and progress in much of these developmentally
weakened platforms.
Despite these realities, the desire and the practical project to re-philosophize
and re-indigenize African education and development can no longer be left on
the shelf. Hence the increasing emergence of, temporally speaking,
postcolonial clusters of an African academic philosophy that has been respond-
ing to the call for new anticolonial contexts. With Nyerere (1974), Kane (1963),
Achebe (1958, 2000), and other essential disquisitions, the important work of
the late Nigerian philosopher Eze (1997, 1998) and his cohorts has added so
much that clearly validates the viability and life-tested pragmatics of African
philosophies: philosophies of education and attached epistemologies that
should all be useful for the much-needed revival of learning and progress
regimes that should be based on and critically responsive to the needs of the
public. It should go without saying that how Africans have successfully in-
quired and reflected on their lives over millennia would stand as a life-affirmed
testimony to the endurance and validity of African thought systems, schemes
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of learning, and related existentialities that were necessary for the survival and
progress of both the individual and the community.
Indeed, with these and other emerging debates having contributed to the
affirmation of historical and current presence of well-established systems of
African philosophies that have successfully guided the social life of people
over many centuries and decades, at least we should have moved beyond the
points of validity and validation and should have both descriptively and
analytically crossed into the sphere of new ways of reviving the old and new
philosophical and epistemological plateaus to reestablish the lost topographies
of culture, learning, and development. Of course, we did not. So much so that
with the global endurance of European hegemony, current systems of educa-
tion wherever they are located still disfavor the history and the actual life of the
still otherized Other. However, with the new migration patterns and with so
many countries becoming more multinational and partly multicultural than
before, the role of teachers to disavow former configurations of the world and
uphold the inclusively endowed learning rights of all learners should become
paramount.
New Cosmopolitanisms and the Global Role of Teachers
While the above selectively describes the important intersections of colonialism
and the philosophical/epistemological effects on African education and devel-
opment, the world has changed in dimensions. The realism of postcolonial
Africa has been mostly one of neocolonialism, where as mentioned above, the
fundamentals of the issues discussed here did not change and colonial philos-
ophies and systems of knowledge including the paramount status of colonial
languages are still at work in most of the continent. But new multi-group
cosmopolitanisms have also been forming across the globe. To be sure, due to
expansive political and economic plunders committed by Africa’s neo-colonial
elite, Africans have been migrating to Western Europe and North America in
large numbers over the past 30 years. In Canada the trends have been as strong
as any in the rest of the world. With so many people moving to Canada,
especially in the past 20 years, the number of people who are identified as
African-Canadian or selectively of African descent in this cold northern coun-
try has quickly reached the 700,000 mark and is expected to increase in the
coming years. The effects of this migration story are multiple, and an obvious
one is the severe brain drain that befalls Africa as most of the people who leave
the continent would be those who are well educated and economically or
intellectually endowed. Although some may prefer to identify this phenome-
non in the more popular configurations of globalization, I selectively prefer to
locate it in the context of cosmopolitanism, for it involves so much more than
just the process of moving peoples and commodities and centers around the
geographic and emerging meaning-making in the context of international and
intergroup interactions and relationships. In this vein, Benhabib (2006) should
have a point when she notes,
Cosmopolitan norms of justice, whatever the conditions of their legal
origination, accrue to individuals as moral and legal persons in a worldwide
civil society … [and] endow individuals, rather than states and their agents,
with certain rights and claims, [and terms such as globalization] are misleading
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in that they fail to address the distinctiveness of cosmopolitan norms. (italics in
the original, p. 16)
In terms of the livelihood events that are instigated by arrival in the new
countries, the issues are complex; culturally, economically, and politically mul-
tilayered; and more often than not ontologically oppositional vis-à-vis the
pre-migration expectations of the new immigrants. By and large, these im-
migrants in the so-called Western democracies find themselves on the lower
rungs of the socioeconomic and political ladder, but they nevertheless become
one component of the ongoing formations of the changing global cos-
mopolitanisms (in the moral, cultural, and politico-economic intentions of the
term) where no matter in what country they reside, they are affected by and
should affect the global transactions that connect all citizens of the world.
Although cosmopolitanism (or world citizenship in the simplest sense of the
term) has assumed more meaning and outcomes than people like Kant had
expected in the 19th century, it nevertheless selectively fits the lives of these
and others who move around the globe in search of better life possibilities and
related educational and professional attachments. Interestingly, one can also
talk about two types of cosmopolitanism today. The first would be based on
choice, where people have the luxury of choosing their place and interactions
in these now expansive, cosmopolitan spheres. The other fits what Hall (2006)
calls vernacular cosmopolitanism, where those who have to be a part of the
global scene but might lack the politico-economic and cultural currency that is
needed, must join the scene at a socially subordinated level. In most instances
most of the new immigrants would fit this reality of vernacular or lower
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the case for this should have achieved more curren-
cy since the now descriptively celebrated but still tragic events of September 11,
2001.
As Giroux (2002) noted, with the 9/11-induced Patriot Act in the US, the
criminalization of the public space, especially there, has become the norm, and
the role of education has shifted from the noble goal of citizenship enhance-
ment to that of undemocratic surveillance practices that threaten the basic
rights of those who are different from the norm in any way. This, of course,
does not bode well for those whose journey was partly triggered by a desire for
more liberating education either for themselves or more so for their children.
With most new immigrants to the West technically different from the norm and
with millions of their children joining current intersections of public education,
the role of teachers to stay with the higher mission of education to safeguard
the rights of all and aim for the social development of every learner should not
be sacrificed to the debased specter of us against them culture. Here the early
principles of general multicultural education where the toleration and publicly
sanctioned but subjectively de-criticalized varied life styles are celebrated
would not suffice. Indeed, the choice of the term life style should deserve one or
two sentences. When we rhetorically talk about culture in the varied contexts
of North American multicultural education, for example, we are actually prac-
ticing in contemporary platforms of schooling life styles, which I submit are
different both analytically and operationally from the practical constructions of
the life that culture qua culture should represent.
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As mentioned above, the meanings of culture should be deliberately
separated from the early staticizations of early cultural writings. Culture con-
tains people’s historical, linguistic, and all related complexities of life manage-
ment and meaning-making projects. It is not and cannot be limited to the
sharing of dressing styles, food taste, and the deliberate exoticization of dif-
ference. Thus the possible application of critical multicultural education
(Ghosh & Abdi, 2004) must be sought, and the full realization by teachers that
the schemes of de-philosophization and de-epistemologization of the African
world view discussed above are not limited to past colonial classrooms, but are
also found in current Western classrooms, libraries, and general discourses, is
important. Indeed, the learning alienation and by extension future develop-
ment demobilization of many children from immigrant families in so-called
pluralistic Western democracies results from the double case of teachers either
not understanding the weaknesses or even the violent outcomes (with respect
to these students’ needs and rights) of what they are teaching and how they are
teaching it or exercising an outright resistance to any challenges that might
change the system. It is here that the importance of critical multicultural educa-
tion, where one main objective is the radical desire to equalize cultures, his-
tories, and resulting life possibilities should be helpful, not in the claim of any
homogenizing intentions, but in the context of contextually practiced diversity.
Attached to the critical platforms of the inclusive and pragmatizable nota-
tions of culture in the educational context is also the issue of racism. With the
spread of globalization and the resulting intersections of cosmopolitan citizen-
ship, there are the effectively metamorphosing realities of global racism. It is
not uncommon (as I can attest to myself in the Canadian context) to hear how
immigrant families in Western countries where the rights of minorities in all
spheres of life as stipulated in all their constitutions should be protected (Kym-
licka, 1998) negatively interact with the debilitating practices of racism that
come not only from other students, but also from teachers and the school
management. The increasing incidences of racism in these schools are not
detached from the lessons that colonialism taught these teachers about the lives
of colonized natives, and for many of them this may be the only learning
correspondence they have ever experienced with the histories and lives of the
new arrivals. The correspondence is anything but constructive. Indeed, to the
surprise of many educational researchers, some of the material that is chosen
for class reading in schools in some parts of Canada seems to have come
straight out of the colonial travel writing, which as Achebe (2000) taught us is
an interesting but fundamentally shallow interpretation of complex, intelligent
life systems that are hardly understood by the racist narrators. Just as trouble-
some is how the story of racism that has no reliable biological validity (Cook,
2002; Gould, 1996) is still institutionalized beyond the schooling space and is
actually supported by national institutions at almost all levels of government
(Goldberg, 2002).
The continuities of the institution of racism should not detain our imagina-
tion that much. To be sure, such events and related life practices persist when
they advantage some groups and always disadvantage others. And although I
always try to avoid the descriptive establishment of a continuing correspon-
dence between the social and educational difficulties that immigrants face in
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the West and the world of racism, the fact remains that if the dominant group
benefits from the continuation of racism, they may not lead the needed cam-
paigns to rescind it. The role of educators must be different. As practitioners in
the crucial area of social development, no one I know of or could know would
go into teaching to help sustain colonialist or racist ways of teaching and
learning. By and large, teachers should be tentatively certified (until proven
otherwise, of course) as leaders in the universal project of citizenship develop-
ment, the upholding of human rights, and the tangible expansion of the real
operations of social justice. Thus to achieve the noble aims of socially binding
and ontologically liberating programs of citizenship development in the
world’s difference-rich classrooms, teachers, especially those in the West’s
increasingly multiethnic and multicultural classrooms, should burn the books
on colonialism, racism, false accommodation, and the pejorative constructions
of toleration. They should instead pave the way for the extensively desired
praxes of critical pedagogy where the experiences as well as the aspirations of
the learner regardless of how he or she is different from the now problematical-
ly celebrated norm are practically valued, and where dialogic methods of
teaching enrich and intersectionally enhance new ways of the educational
imperative, which should serve the needs and rights of every student.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article I revisit the colonial and postcolonial problems
of decentering African histories, cultures, thought systems, and ways of know-
ing. The processes of de-philosophization and de-epistemologization that I
speak about were not achieved by colonizing Europeans through one-time
deformation of traditional life as we should have known it. They were, rather,
undertaken via the systematic deculturing and miseducation of Africans and
others who have been subjected to the same practices that were spawned by
Europe’s imperial plunder. With African countries achieving some form of
political independence, the basic philosophies of colonial education and ways
of knowing were not modified. Instead, these systems of teaching and learning
were implemented intact during the postcolonial period. Undoubtedly this has
affected the place of education as capable of providing people with correct
social development prospects. With this complemented by the oppressive elite
systems that have marginalized most of the population in almost all countries
in sub-Saharan Africa, Africans have been migrating to the West in large
numbers in the past 30 years.
In many of these cases, the receiving countries such as Canada had (have)
immediately to deal with the influx of many African children into the educa-
tion system, now a corporeal part of the country’s sometimes misnamed multi-
cultural mosaic. Instead of opening their minds to the world of these children,
it seems that many teachers in Western classrooms reflected the lessons they
learned through the abundant colonial literature and other more recent
problems that they associate with Africa. Thus the clash of intentions and
expectations has led to many of these children disengaging from the system,
with many negative implications for the lives of these learners, but also for the
countries that they would have served as productive citizens contributing to
the betterment not only of the new lands, but also their old societies. To
disavow these counter-educational and counter-social development practices,
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teachers are encouraged to strive to achieve critically informed classrooms that
affirm the citizenship rights of all learners, and in the process fulfill the noble
learning mission of helping these children and all other children to constitute
for themselves and their societies better life prospects and less liable sociocul-
tural and political-economic spaces.
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